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FROM AUSTRALOPITHECUS TO CYBORGS. ARE WE FACING 
THE END OF HUMAN EVOLUTION?
Justo Aznar1, Enrique Burguete2
Abstract: Social implementation of post-humanism could affect the biological evolution of living beings and especially that 
of humans. This paper addresses the issue from the biological and anthropological-philosophical perspectives. From the 
biological perspective, reference is made first to the evolution of hominids until the emergence of Homo sapiens, and secondly, 
to the theories of evolution with special reference to their scientific foundation and the theory of extended heredity. In the 
anthropological-philosophical part, the paradigm is presented according to which human consciousness, in its emancipatory 
zeal against biological nature, must “appropriate” the roots of its physis to transcend the human and move towards a more 
“perfect” entity; we also assess the theory that refers this will to the awakening of the cosmic consciousness in our conscious 
matter. Finally, it assesses whether this post-humanist emancipatory paradigm implies true evolution or, instead, an involution 
to the primitive state of nature.
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De Australopithecus a cyborgs. ¿Nos enfrentamos al final de la evolución humana?
Resumen: La implementación social del poshumanismo podría afectar la evolución biológica de los seres vivos y, especialmente, 
la de los humanos. Este artículo aborda el tema desde las perspectivas biológica y antropológico-filosófica. Desde la perspectiva 
biológica, se hace referencia, en primer lugar, a la evolución de los homínidos hasta la aparición del Homo sapiens, y en segundo 
lugar a las teorías de la evolución, con especial referencia a su fundamento científico y a la teoría de la herencia extendida. En 
la parte antropológico-filosófica se presenta el paradigma según el cual la conciencia humana, en su afán emancipador frente 
a la naturaleza biológica, debe “apropiarse” de las raíces de su physis para trascender lo humano y avanzar hacia una entidad 
más “perfecta”; evalúa también la teoría que refiere esta voluntad al despertar de la conciencia cósmica en nuestra materia 
consciente. Finalmente, juzga si este paradigma emancipatorio poshumanista implica una verdadera evolución o, en cambio, 
una involución al primitivo estado de naturaleza.
Palabras clave: teorías de la evolución, Australopithecus, cyborgs, posthumanismo, transhumanismo, técnica somática
Do Australopithecus aos ciborgues. Estamos diante do fim da evolução humana?
Resumo: A implementação social do pós-humanismo pode afetar a evolução biológica dos seres vivos e especialmente dos 
humanos. Esse artigo aborda o problema de perspectivas biológicas e antropológico-filosófica. Desde uma perspectiva biológica, 
é feito referencia primeiro à evolução de hominídeos até a emergência do Homo sapiens e, em seguida, às teorias da evolução, 
com especial referencia ao seu fundamento científico e à teoria da hereditariedade estendida. Na parte antropológico-filosófica, 
o paradigma é apresentado de acordo com o qual a consciência humana, em seu zelo emancipatório da natureza biológica, 
deve “apropriar” as raízes da sua natureza para transcender o humano e se mover em direção a uma entidade mais “perfeita”: 
nós também avaliamos a teoria que refere este desejo ao despertar da consciência cósmica em nossa matéria consciente. 
Finalmente, ele avalia se este paradigma emancipatório pós-humanista implica evolução verdadeira ou, contrariamente, uma 
involução para o estado primitivo da natureza.
Palavras chave: teorias da evolução, Australopithecus, ciborgues, pós-humanismo, transhumanismo, somatécnica
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I. From Australopithecus to Homo sapiens
Biological evolution could be coming to an end, 
because man has been gradually acquiring a tech-
nological power that allows him to bring about 
changes in the nature of living beings, and even in 
his own self. It may be, as Yuval Noah Harari sug-
gests, that “we are on the cusp of a new era of self-
guided evolution enabled by genetic engineering 
technologies and driven by the desire to ‘improve’ 
our bodies and minds”(1).
This has been extensively discussed by the recent 
winner of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, Jennifer 
A. Doudna, in her book “A Crack in Creation. 
Gene Editing and Unthinkable Power to Con-
trol Evolution”, where, in addition to describing 
the discovery of CRISPR-Cas 9 technology, she 
contends that this may be the newest and most 
effective genetic engineering tool, and that CRIS-
PR could put the process of biological evolution 
under human control(2).    
Organic life appeared on earth around 3800 mil-
lion years ago. Since then, and from the first sin-
gle-celled organisms, living beings have evolved to 
reach the somatic fullness —the phenotype— of 
non-human primates, orangutans and Homo sa-
piens.
Homo sapiens split from orangutans and chim-
panzees approximately 8 and 5 million years ago, 
respectively(3). Some organic structures of these 
hominins have undergone changes since early ge-
nus Homo, especially the brain, which increased in 
size from 450 cm3 in primitive hominins to 1350 
cm3 in modern humans. 
The first question that arises when reflecting on 
the evolution of the genus Homo is to determine, 
with the greatest possible certainty, who our early 
ancestors were. The first hominins separated from 
gorillas 8 million years ago, and that humans and 
chimpanzee lineages did so around 5 million years 
ago. However, this dating cannot be considered 
definitive due to a lack of fossil data from that 
time(4).
Nevertheless, these doubts appeared to be resolved 
when, in 1973, Mary Leakey and Donald Johan-
son discovered fossil remains of hominins of be-
tween 3 and 3.5 million years old in east Africa. 
This genus was called Australopithecus afarensis and 
the individual fossil discovered was called “Lucy”. 
The inclusion of Lucy within the genus Homo was 
based on her bipedalism, a feature that has been 
considered as definitive for classifying an indi-
vidual as the genus Homo. At that time, Lucy was 
considered the oldest individual of that genus(4).
The other feature that gives these ancestors —our 
predecessors— human character, is the size of 
their brain. As already mentioned, Lucy’s brain 
was similar in size to that of an adult chimpan-
zee, and even its overall phenotype was more like 
a chimpanzee than a primitive human. 
For a long time, Australopithecus afarensis was con-
sidered the oldest hominin, but in the mid-1990s, 
others were discovered, apparently older than A. 
afarensis. One of these, Australopithecus anamen-
sis, also biped, was ascribed an age of 4.1 million 
years(3).
Other hominins, part-contemporaries of Austra-
lopithecus, were Kenyanthropus and Paranthropus. 
Paranthropus represents a side branch of the homi-
nin lineage that has become extinct(5). Other spe-
cies of the genus Australopithecus have also been 
identified, such as Australopithecus: bahrelghazali, 
platyops, africanus, garhi and sediba(6).
About 2.5 million years ago, Homo habilis, which 
had a cranial capacity of just over 600 cm3, and 
Homo erectus, with a cranial capacity of 800 to 
1100 cm3, lived in Africa(5). Homo erectus was the 
first intercontinental migrant among our homi-
nin ancestors, for shortly after their emergence in 
Africa, they spread across Europe and Asia, even 
reaching the Indonesian archipelago and northern 
China. Both the fossils of Homo erectus discov-
ered in Java and those discovered in Georgia were 
deemed to be between 1.8 and 1.6 million years 
old(5).
In the mid-1970s, Richard Leakey, son of Mary 
Leakey and her anthropologist husband Louis, 
discovered a very well preserved skull fossil in 
Koobi Fora (Kenya), which was classified as speci-
men KNM-ER 1470(3); it was included within 
the species Homo habilis and ascribed an age of 
2.42 million years(3). 
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However, large intraspecific variation was detected 
in the Homo habilis fossil remains found, so some 
of these specimens, especially those with larger 
skulls, were redefined as Homo rudolfensis(3). This 
genus was confirmed when another fossil skull, 
also classified within the species Homo was like-
wise discovered in Koobi Fora(3), which seems 
to support the theory that two species of Homo 
existed 2 million years ago in Africa: habilis and 
rudolfensis.
However, in the early twenty-first century, three 
new candidates for the oldest hominin were dis-
covered: Sahelanthropus tchandensis, who lived 6 
or 7 million years ago; Orirrin tugenesis, discov-
ered in Tugen, Kenya, thought to be 6 to 7 million 
years old; and Ardipithecus ramidus discovered in 
Europe, 4.4 million years old(4), although it is not 
fully clear whether these last three “could be vari-
ants of the various lineages of apes that existed be-
fore the true ‘hominins’ appeared(4)”. Therefore, 
Australopithecus — either aferesis or anamensis — 
generally tends to be considered our earliest ances-
tors, with an age of around 3 million years(4). 
As previously mentioned, notwithstanding the 
fossils discovered in Africa in 1921 and 1923, fos-
sil remains were discovered in Zhoukoudian, Chi-
na, known as “Peking Man”, which were classified 
as Sinanthropus pekinensis(3). 
Also in 1891, fossil remains were discovered on 
the island of Java, and accordingly named “Java 
Man”, with these hominin remains seemingly the 
oldest discovered in Asia. Although it had a small-
er brain than modern humans, because it walked 
upright, its discoverer, Eugene Dubois, placed it 
within the genus Homo and called it Pithecan-
thropus erectus(3). In the 1990s, “Java Man” was 
ascribed an age of 1.8 million years(3), very simi-
lar to that of the African Homo erectus, which has 
been a hindrance to be able to say that the Asian 
Homo erectus could be a direct descendant of the 
African erectus. 
Another difficulty arose from the discovery of 
fossil remains in Dmanisi, Georgia, in 1991, be-
cause they were also ascribed an age of 1.8 million 
years(3). 
Another group of hominins are the “Neander-
thals”, who appeared in Europe 200,000 years 
ago and survived until 30,000 years ago. The first 
Neanderthal fossil was discovered in 1856 in the 
Neander Valley near Dusseldorf (Germany), and 
classified by William King as Homo neandertha-
lensis. Based on this first taxonomic classification, 
up to 34 different species and six genera of Nean-
derthals have been proposed(3). In terms of their 
relationship with Homo sapiens, the most widely 
accepted theory is that Neanderthals and Homo 
sapiens are two different species, two sister groups 
of the genus Homo. 
Neanderthals were eliminated by modern humans, 
the “Cro-Magnons”(4). Although it was initially 
thought that the Neanderthals had not interbred 
with Homo sapiens, in 2010, Svante Pääbo showed 
that both species would have hybridised, as about 
4% of genes in modern humans are of Neander-
thal origin(3)(4). Incidentally, these genes control 
important functions such as smell, vision, cell 
division, spermatogenesis, the immune system, 
muscle contraction and language(4).
Apparently, though, the hominin species does not 
end here since, in October 2004, the journal Na-
ture published the finding by Michael Morwood 
and colleagues of a tiny hominin fossil on the Is-
land of Flores, which they called Homo florisiensis; 
the fossil had a very small body and a tiny brain, 
even smaller than that of a newborn human, and 
lived on the island between 60,000 and 18,000 
years ago(4). How that group of hominins arrived 
on Flores and the reason for their small size is cur-
rently unknown.
In 2010, new skeletal remains were discovered in 
the region of Altair (Russia) in Denisova Cave, 
which were apparently about 100,000 years old. 
Following DNA tests, they were classified as a hu-
man species, different from the Neanderthals and 
modern humans. Individuals of this new species 
have been named “Denisovans”(3,4). The Den-
isovans spread across Asia, from 125,000 until 
12,000 years ago and interbred with humans pre-
sent there, which has been confirmed by the find-
ing of around 3% of Denisovan genes in modern 
humans(3,4).
Besides the aspects discussed thus far in relation 
to the genus Homo, one subject that has fascinat-
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ed paleoanthropologists is whether Homo sapiens 
originated from a single population or from sev-
eral species, and in one or different places.
Using a genetic evolution technique called the 
“molecular clock”, it has been possible to calculate 
the time elapsed from the moment a gene origi-
nates until the present time, by the number of 
mutations found therein.
The molecular clock is based on “the probability 
that the changes in a given gene are constant, since 
the protein function does not change and is, there-
fore, outside natural selection. Thus, the differ-
ence in the number of changes found between the 
genes of two species can be used to calculate the 
time elapsed from a given time to their common 
ancestor”. Accordingly, using the molecular clock, 
we can reconstruct the evolutionary history and 
branching order of different human lineages(3,4). 
Using the molecular clock, it has been determined 
that modern humans emerged in east Africa less 
than 200,000 years ago(4). That is to say, as mod-
ern humans expanded their migrations outside 
Africa, they would have eliminated the rest of the 
hominins they encountered in the territories that 
they took over, imposing themselves as the only 
hominins who survived on earth, from which we 
are descended. This model has been called the 
“complete replacement model”(4). 
But there is another option, which holds that 
“modern humans did not originate in a specific 
place, but in various places, and did not constitute 
a single population, which then spread through-
out the world; rather, we come from different 
populations settled in different regions, which 
were genetically intermingled and that evolved as 
a unique species”(4). This model has been called 
the “multiregional evolution model”(3,4). Accord-
ing to Cela-Conde and Ayala(3), neither of the 
two models —the “replacement” or the “multire-
gional”— can be regarded as definitive, although 
the evidence available today supports the idea that 
modern humans arose in Africa and subsequently 
expanded into other continents, so that “at the 
present time, there is little doubt that Africa was 
the cradle of the hominins”(3).
Af Nevertheless, as Lee and Yoon said in their 
recent book, the fundamental questions remain 
unresolved: Where do modern humans come 
from? What paths have they followed to get to 
where we are today? And where will our human 
journey lead?(4).  Moreover, “for now, we do not 
have even basic information on how Homo sapiens 
emerged”(6).
In addition to the foregoing, it may be said that 
the mechanisms that have governed the evolution 
of living beings to modern man are not fully un-
derstood, although the “Theory of Evolution” is 
the one that prevails in the scientific field. We shall 
refer to this in the next chapter.
II. The Theory of Evolution
In his 1859 book “On the Origin of Species”, 
Darwin stated that the development and evolu-
tion of living beings is governed by natural selec-
tion, which makes the fittest prevail and elimi-
nates the weakest(6). If we accept this theory, it 
could be said that living beings themselves and 
species are not immutable, and that differences 
in their phenotypes are the consequence of the 
aforementioned biological evolution(6). By focus-
ing his evolutionary theory exclusively on natural 
biological mechanisms, Darwin excludes the pur-
pose in evolution, that is, the teleology. As Darwin 
himself says: “It seems that there is no [more] de-
sign in the variability of organic beings and in [the 
action of ] natural selection [than in the course 
which the wind blows]”(7).
However, his contemporary Alfred Russel Wal-
lace argues that natural selection does not seem 
to be sufficient to explain the origin of the hu-
man species. According to him, we humans would 
not have become what we are if only the afore-
mentioned natural selection had been taken into 
account(8), so that he somehow introduces the 
possibility of an external —possibly divine— in-
tervention in the evolutionary process itself.
According to Cela-Conde and Ayala, when study-
ing the Theory of Evolution, three different as-
pects need to be examined: “The first is the fact 
of evolution itself, that is, the finding that species 
change over time and are related to each other”; 
the second is its history, and the third refers to the 
causes of evolution, “this is the processes that de-
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termine the morphological, physiological and be-
havioural characteristics of organisms in particular 
and the relationships that exist between them”(3).
After the theories proposed by Darwin and Wal-
lace, a breakthrough in understanding the mecha-
nisms of “biological evolution” occurred with the 
discovery in 1900 of the “Mendelian Theory of 
Inheritance”, which emphasizes the role of hered-
ity in the offspring. 
Darwinian Theory was redefined in 1930 by The-
odosius Dobzhansky, in his book “Genetics and 
the Origin of Species” by combining natural se-
lection with Mendelian inheritance(9). As Cela-
Conde and Ayala said, this work by Dobzhansky 
could be considered the most important contribu-
tion in what is known as the “Synthetic Theory” 
or “Modern Theory of Evolution”(3).
Over time, a series of unified principles have grad-
ually been added to the Synthetic Theory, which 
have led to what has been termed “Modern Syn-
thesis” or “neo-Darwinism”(10); this espouses that 
biological evolution is the result of the interaction 
of two main forces: genetic variation and natural 
selection. In short, it could be argued that neo-
Darwinism is defined by ongoing genetic changes 
in individuals as a result of random processes, with 
no control mechanism or particular system direct-
ing these mutations to purposes that benefit the 
individuals concerned; thus it is natural selection 
that is the main regulatory factor of evolution(11). 
In the words of Richard Dawkins, the Modern 
Synthesis or neo-Darwinian Synthesis of Evolu-
tion is a mechanistic theory of population genetics 
which is based on the randomness of mutations, 
and excludes any purpose in the evolutionary pro-
cess(12).
Ernst Mayr, one of the founders of neo-Darwin-
ism, distinguishes between “microevolution” and 
“macroevolution”(13). In his view, microevolu-
tion refers to the changes that can occur within 
the same species, while macroevolution refers to 
changes at the highest level of biological classifica-
tion. 
To sum up, according to Artigas and Turbón(14), 
the Synthetic Theory is characterized by the in-
teraction of five factors: (a) mutations or random 
changes in the inherited genetic material; (b) ge-
netic recombination thereof; (c) genetic drift or 
random changes in the frequency of genetic vari-
ants; (d) genetic migration, which incorporates in-
dividual carriers of different genetic variations in 
the reproductive group, and (e) finally, the natural 
selection caused mainly by the environment. 
In both the Darwinian Theory and the Synthetic 
or neo-Darwinian Theory, evolution occurs by 
the slow and inexorable accumulation of small 
genetic variations (mutations) and by natural 
selection of the new beings produced. “Genetic 
mutations may be of two categories: point muta-
tions affecting only one or a few nucleotides of a 
gene; and chromosome mutations, affecting, par-
tially or completely, one or more chromosomes 
and which can change the organization of a given 
chromosome or even affect the number of chro-
mosomes”(3).
In 1968, Japanese geneticist Motoo Kimura pro-
posed what he called the “Neutral Theory” of mo-
lecular evolution. It posits that “a great part of the 
genetic variation observed in populations and spe-
cies is due to the fluctuation and random fixation 
in the genome of neutral genetic variants”(15), so 
that “many of the changes that take place in the 
DNA and protein sequences are adaptively neu-
tral, that is to say, they have little or no effect on 
the function of the molecules”(3).
In 1983, Kimura, in collaboration with Tomoko 
Ohta, developed the so-called “Neutral Theory of 
Molecular Evolution”, which contributed deci-
sively to acceptance of the Neutral Theory as one 
more possibility within biological evolution(16). 
In the 1970s, Stephen Jay Gould(17) proposed a 
new alternative to biological evolution, which he 
called the “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory”; this 
argues that the emergence of new strains of living 
organisms occurred abruptly or in “jumps”, but 
after such “jumps” there might be periods of cer-
tain equilibrium, i.e. periods of slow evolution. In 
a way, the latter allows the Synthetic Theory of 
Evolution and the Punctuated Equilibrium Theo-
ry to be combined.
However, some authors argue that there is a need 
to develop a “postmodern” synthesis of the The-
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ory of Evolution following the incorporation of 
new forms of hereditary transmission, that have 
expanded the neo-Darwinian Evolutionary The-
ory(18,19), the most significant of which, in our 
view, is so-called “Extended Heredity”.
Theory of Extended Heredity
The mechanisms of action of Extended Heredity 
were studied in depth by Russell Bonduriansky 
and Troy Day in their recent book “Extended He-
redity”(20), in which they essentially claim that 
non-genetic acquired factors can be transmitted 
to offspring. 
Indeed, until recently, it was thought that acquired 
traits could not be inherited, as it was believed that 
only genes could mediate in the transmission of 
biological information. However, according to the 
theory of Extended Heredity, “there is also non-
genetic inheritance, in which other factors that are 
transmitted to offspring may play a role, some of 
which have the capacity to regenerate themselves 
and persist over multiple generations”(20). It can 
therefore be said that “[g]enes have a great deal 
of influence [on evolutionary processes] but their 
control is far from absolute”, because there is “em-
pirical evidence revealing that there is often much 
more to heredity than genes alone”(20). Accord-
ing Bonduriansky and Day, acceptance of the con-
cept of Extended Heredity may revolutionize our 
ideas about biological evolutionary processes(20).
Among the non-genetic factors involved in Ex-
tended Heredity, epigenetic factors play an im-
portant role. But what do we mean when we talk 
about epigenetic factors?
The term epigenetics “is used in the ‘broad sense’ 
by evolutionary ecologists and developmental 
biologists to try to explain how environmental 
factors can shape the phenotypes of living be-
ings, but it is also used in a ‘narrower sense’ by 
molecular biologists to try to further understand 
the mechanisms that regulate gene expression. In 
other words, the first definition primarily affects 
the constitution of phenotypes, while the second, 
narrower, particularly affects the molecular mech-
anisms”(20).
Bonduriansky and Day restrict the term epige-
netic, in relation to biological evolution, to the 
“narrower sense” referred to above. In their view, 
epigenetic changes can be passed on through gen-
erations, independently of the genes, affecting the 
mechanisms of inheritance(20), which forms the 
basis of so-called “transgenerational epigenetic in-
heritance”(21).
However, transgenerational epigenetic inheritance 
is not the only form of non-genetic inheritance, as 
other non-genetic mechanisms may also facilitate 
the transmission of information to offspring and 
affect biological evolution. These might include: 
cytoplasmic, structural, symbiotic and behaviour-
al factors. As Bonduriansky and Day contend, “in 
the exciting field of epigenetics it is easy to forget 
that this heredity is only one possibility among 
the various mechanisms that may occur in non-
genetic inheritance”(20).
Among the non-epigenetic mechanisms of biolog-
ical inheritance, so-called “niche construction” has 
been proposed. This refers to the fact that the en-
vironment in which a biological process develops 
can influence the evolutionary process itself and, 
above all, to how changes could be transmitted to 
offspring(22).
There is also the theory of “phenotypic plastici-
ty”(23), which could be defined as the ability of an 
organism to change its phenotype in response to 
environmental influences(24), so that the shape, 
appearance and behaviour of a living animal, i.e. 
its phenotype, may be influenced by factors exter-
nal to it.
Furthermore, Shapiro et al.(25) propose the exist-
ence of natural genetic engineering. This would 
act similarly to laboratory genetic engineering, 
because in their view, the cell genome is not just 
a repository of information, but rather a reading 
system that can be manipulated by the cell itself, 
since it has a biological system that can direct the 
information towards a specific purpose, so that the 
cells can use these capabilities to self-regulate their 
own evolution(26).
As Bonduriansky and Day argue, “today the ex-
istence of nongenetic inheritance is no longer in 
question [...]. But the role of nongenetic inherit-
ance in evolution is much more difficult to estab-
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lish”. Nevertheless, in their opinion, its existence 
is indisputable, since they believe that all of the 
necessary conditions arise to assume that some 
non-genetic factors are transmitted stably across 
generations. If all this is confirmed, as seems to be 
the case, we will need to rethink the evolutionary 
history of humans, since the concept of Extended 
Heredity undoubtedly represents a break with the 
past(26).
In any case, the evolutionary mechanisms con-
sidered up to this point essentially respond to 
what have been called “minor transitions” in the 
evolutionary process, i.e. to “microevolution”, 
in the sense that it uses this concept; however, 
“macroevolution”(13), the major evolutionary 
transactions, and essentially the production of 
new species, seems a problem not yet well eluci-
dated. Even Charles Darwin, in his book “The 
Origin of Species”, did not devote much attention 
to the process by which new species emerge(20), 
among other reasons because of the difficulty in 
accepting a definition of species. Species can also 
be defined as a group of individuals that has the 
potential to interbreed and that is reproductively 
isolated from other such groups(27). For Mayr, “a 
species is a group of natural populations that have 
the potential to interbreed and are reproductively 
isolated from other groups of populations”(28), or 
it can also be defined as “a single lineage of ances-
tral descendant populations of organisms which 
maintains its identity from other such lineages 
and which has its own evolutionary tendencies 
and historical fate” (Wiley)(29). The emergence 
of a new species is a process by which a group of 
individuals splits off from a previous species and 
reaches the possibility of reproducing separately 
from their ancestral group(20).
With regard to potential mechanisms of specia-
tion, some time ago Sewall Wright proposed a 
mechanism based on the fact that certain groups of 
individuals can grow to a maximum peak, which 
can then descend to a minimum level, and then 
increase again to another peak. From one of those 
peaks, its individuals can reproduce and evolve in 
isolation, which can lead to a new species(30).
In the late sixties, Lynn Margulis proposed a new 
theory to support the origin of new species, sug-
gesting that they could be obtained by the symbi-
osis of two primitive species, for example, from an 
archaea (prokaryote) and a bacterium, biologically 
active cells(20,31).
More recently, John Maynard Smith and Eörs Sza-
thmáry revisited this same theory to support the 
emergence of eukaryotic cells through the symbio-
sis of archaea (prokaryotes) and bacteria(20,32).
Without a doubt though, aside from the mecha-
nisms proposed to support the aforementioned 
biological evolution, an important background 
aspect is to determine whether evolutionary pro-
cesses occur randomly, i.e. if they occur at ran-
dom or if there is any kind of purpose in them. 
We shall not refer to this in depth here, which we 
have already done in a previous paper(33), but we 
shall reflect briefly on the importance of the issue. 
The core of the matter is to determine whether or 
not there is teleology in biological evolution, or if 
at least, if one does not want to accept teleology, 
one acknowledges the existence of self-regulatory 
mechanisms in the genomic structure of living be-
ings that can propitiate their evolution towards 
some specific purpose. This is what has been called 
“teleonomy”, a term which — since it does not 
require any external intervention — has greater 
acceptance among moderate evolutionists. This 
biological mechanism has been called the “Theory 
of Self-regulation”. 
However, in addition to the biological mecha-
nisms discussed, we may add the potential to arti-
ficially modify the biological evolutionary process. 
Indeed, Doudna, in her aforementioned book, 
“A Crack in Evolution,” suggests the possibility 
that by using genetic editing with CRISPR-Cas 
9, man could, in some way, modify the biological 
evolutionary process(2). For about the hundred 
thousand years of modern human existence, the 
genome of Homo sapiens has been modelled by the 
twin forces of random mutation and natural selec-
tion. Now, for the first time, we possess the ability 
to edit not only the DNA of any living human 
being, but also the DNA of future generations; in 
essence, to direct the evolution of our own species. 
This is something unprecedented in the history of 
life on Earth(34).
III. Technogenesis of the Posthuman or anthro-
pogenesis of the humanoid robot
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Taken to the extreme, the rationalizing paradigm 
described by Max Weber(35) in the middle of the 
last century —whose main indicators are calcula-
bility, efficiency and predictability— could allow 
us to control our own destiny as individuals and 
as a species, with the help of technology. In fact, 
in 2003, a report by the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF)(36) showed their confidence that the 
convergence of sciences such as nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, information technology and cog-
nitive sciences (NBIC) would allow evolution to 
be technologically re-launched to achieve a new 
type of man in endless progress, a man impervi-
ous to disease and aging. This “re-launch” would 
start with the “biologization” of the artificial by 
biomimicry.
The confidence of the NSF in NBIC convergence 
is not entirely unfounded. At the end of the day, 
there are few in the twenty-first century who can 
say that their feelings and dreams are not medi-
ated by technology(37). Perhaps for this reason, 
enhancement (a term used to designate interven-
tions to improve human functioning beyond what 
is necessary to sustain or restore good health(38) 
is an increasingly used concept in the language of 
philosophy and biomedicine.  
The transhumanist movement believes that en-
hancement is not an option, but a duty. It affirms, 
in fact, the “moral duty to improve physical and 
cognitive capabilities of the human species, and to 
apply new technologies to man to eliminate un-
desirable and unnecessary aspects of the human 
condition, such as: suffering, sickness, aging, and 
even the mortal condition”(38). Its initial suppo-
sition is that aging brings no biological benefit to 
the individual and death is but a correctable side 
effect of natural selection; the expression of its re-
sounding failure at having been unable to facilitate 
mechanisms of repair, regeneration and renewal of 
biological structures(39).
Epistemologically, transhumanism is rooted in the 
hermeneutics of evolutionism and technology(37) 
conjectured in 1923 by Julian Huxley, who pre-
dicted the possibility of “the education of old fac-
ulties to new heights, and of the discovery of new 
faculties altogether”(40). Against the randomness 
and margin of error of natural selection, compared 
by Dawkins with a ‘Blind Watchmaker’(41), man 
would have the responsibility to establish a “con-
scious evolution”. 
In fact, with Huxley began a new evolutionary 
paradigm based on the potential ability of human 
consciousness to penetrate the roots of biology in 
order to provide vision, direction and guidance for 
the flourishing of “a new kind (of life) that will 
be the dominant and highest life form”(39). This 
new kind of life will be, in the first instance, an 
“enhanced human” or transhuman which will lat-
er transition to the posthuman: a being “more per-
fect” than its predecessors and that will take our 
species to the culmination of its essence in terms 
of the fulfilment of its rationality and will(42). 
The posthuman will prolong his life without de-
cline, will have a greater intellectual capacity and 
absolute control of his emotions. In short, he will 
enjoy a body in accordance with his wishes, which 
will be able to produce copies of itself(43), con-
fining the human to the status of an evolutionary 
episode already surpassed whose only greatness, as 
Nietzsche said(44), lies in being a bridge and not 
an end: a transition and a decline. 
Transhumanism and posthumanism therefore un-
derstand natural selection as the “prehistory” of 
a dual evolutionary sequence not yet completed, 
albeit in an advanced stage of development: tech-
nogenesis of the posthuman(45) and anthropo-
genesis of the humanoid. 
Cosmic consciousness as an engine of evolution
For transhumanism, the engine of evolution is 
not the random mutation of genes or the filter 
of natural selection(46), but the will, essence of 
reality and the universe, although man’s task. Hy-
bridization between the natural and the artificial, 
between human consciousness and artificial in-
telligence, requires the acquiescence of humans, 
but does not respond to their original initiative. 
Rather, it would be the universe itself who would 
have “endowed itself with small representations of 
itself or with sparks of a more intense subsequent 
moment”(47), in which human consciousness 
becomes universal consciousness and brings the 
development of nature to its fullness. For Kur-
zweil, our identity is based on an evolving mind 
file when we take the huge step of replicating our-
selves in computer technology. In his own words, 
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“we will be software, not hardware”(48).
For transhumanists, it seems time to evolve past 
Logos consciousness to form Holos conscious-
ness(49); to take responsibility for the evolution 
of the cosmos with which we are one; to transcend 
ourselves to energize and direct our evolution to-
wards a new asexual, immortal, hybrid and pro-
foundly egalitarian species(50,51), in which there 
is no place for selfishness, anger or the cruelty of 
human nature. 
Somatechnics, enhancement and eliminative ma-
terialism
There is no doubt that man is more than nature 
and that his evolution would not be explained 
without technology. But while human technology 
transformed the world, it has also transformed 
man himself. To explain this phenomenon, the 
concept somatechnics is gaining strength; this 
states that man is nothing but embodied technolo-
gy(52). Indeed, there is some truth in this, because 
our body is actively involved in the reception of 
technological changes, as evidenced by the plas-
tic properties of the central nervous system(52). 
Therefore, for transhumanism, it is meaningless to 
claim that technological or biomedical modifica-
tion of the body could adversely affect our nature, 
because it was never anything other than embod-
ied technology. 
Nevertheless, to date, technoscientific interven-
tion on our nature has not exceeded the human 
and its function has been strictly therapeutic and 
of adaptation to the natural environment and so-
cial life. Today, however, technology allows trans-
formations of the human body that go beyond 
therapy to improve the physical, cognitive and 
even moral conditions of man, taking him to lim-
its that transcend his nature.
In practice, setting the ethical boundaries between 
therapy and enhancement may be difficult, be-
cause as people we define ourselves by a free will 
“in itself ” that transcends us and gives us the 
power to decide the “where” to which to turn as 
our good or end(53). The properly human act, in 
short, is not impulse, but praxis. The impulse is a 
creation of nature, but the praxis is what follows 
the impulse. Hence, it is correct to say of man that 
he is a being destined, “by nature”, to intention-
ally go beyond his nature(54) through praxis and 
under the guidance of his reason. 
In this regard, prolonging life and overcoming the 
limits of our nature is a purely human desire that 
posthumanism takes to its logical conclusion. 
Posthumanism and progress
Is post-humanism a true evolution or progress? 
To answer this question, we will distinguish, with 
Robert Spaemann, between two types of progress 
according to the end to further. Thus, there is pro-
gress that makes sense thanks to the achievement 
of an end and progress that is an “improvement”, 
regardless of the end. An example of the first type 
would be the progress that takes place in the con-
struction of a machine, because none of it would 
make sense if it was never built and operated. In 
the second type of progress, in contrast, the telos 
of the process is already done when the improve-
ment begins. 
The latter is, we believe, the case of man under-
stood as an end in himself and already accom-
plished, although in changing conditions; as 
“someone” — and not “something” — for whom 
progress implies maturation, deployment and a 
good life(55); as someone who is defined by his 
substance and not by all of his accidents. Thus, 
progress referring to man does not imply the pro-
duction of a final whole but service to an already 
existing end(54).
That said, who is it then who would progress if 
the transhumanist project is consummated? Hu-
manity, understood as an abstract group, at being 
expanded? Or individual self-awareness that could 
unfold in the space of its essence, free from the 
natural constraints that it did not choose?  
It would hardly be humanity, because it is not in-
dependent of the historical, natural and cosmic 
conditions that constitute its vital space, nor of 
the moral norms that continue to be constituted 
by individuals who, while belonging to a biologi-
cal species, are also persons(54). Furthermore, 
“humanity is not the subject of a common desire 
to which progress or setbacks can be attributed. 
Rather, the normal thing in progress attributed to 
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collective subjects that some groups improve ‘at 
the expense of ’ or in comparison with others”(54). 
In this respect, a transhuman future would widen 
the gap between those who possess the technologi-
cal and economic capacity “to improve oneself” 
and those who do not. 
The problem of giving meaning and substance to 
a life of indefinite duration, avoiding boredom 
and finding ways to maintain a coherent personal 
identity must also be considered. If human living 
has a projective character(56) and our destiny is 
constructed by the indirect influence that each of 
our actions and omissions exerts on us, it would 
be foolish to forget that there is a “before” and “af-
ter” these. Should we then worry endlessly about 
the consequences of our present actions on a fu-
ture individual who will probably have difficulty 
identifying with the “I” that we are today?  Or 
as Antonio Diéguez wonders, what consequences 
will hyper-extended longevity have on our social 
and family relationships?(57).
Special mention should be made of the social 
consequences of a perpetually aging population. 
How many years then would the improved and 
hedonistic individual to whom posthumanism as-
pires have to work? There will be those who will 
say none, since it will be the machines who work 
for him. But this must also be able to withstand 
two objections: the first, how to fill the hours of a 
quasi-eternal life, devoted entirely to leisure; and 
the second, if humanoid robots —when artificial 
intelligence becomes self-aware— will agree to be 
our slaves. 
Moreover, if the posthuman is a cyborg whose op-
erating system incorporates the synaptic matrix of 
a scanned human brain —or a chip that houses 
the memories and experiences of what was once a 
man— several questions arise: Would conscious-
ness downloaded onto a computer support retain 
its previous marital status? Who will authorize 
the digital copy and download of a conscious-
ness? Who will own the rights to download the 
consciousness of a famous person or a Nobel Prize 
winner?
The issue does not improve when we consider pro-
gress on individual self-awareness understood as a 
“bundle of sensations”. For although his emanci-
pation from the physical restraints that limit and 
engender pain could be considered progress, the 
question arises as to whether subjective well-being 
is the ultimate end of a rational individual. Be-
cause if it were, progress would arrive earlier with 
the administration of narcotic drugs that would 
induce states of euphoria, tearing consciousness 
apart from all contact with reality.
In any case, it makes sense that when the natu-
ral is presented as something from which to be 
emancipated, it is “the artificial” that carries out 
the transformation of the natural into artifac-
tual. Until the artificial possesses that capacity, it 
would be posthumanist “engineers” who would 
design evolution, probably eliminating the “defec-
tive ones” for eugenic reasons. Thus, the ethical 
conception which has its foundation —as Jürgen 
Habermas(58) suggests— in the moral autonomy 
of rational beings would be undermined.
It may be concluded, therefore, that the emanci-
patory goal of transhumanism and its idea of im-
provement are unpursuable myths. When the idea 
of progress disparages the limits of natural organi-
zation, we cannot speak of true progress. 
Conclusions
Organic life appeared on earth around 3800 mi-
llion years ago. Since then, and from the first sin-
gle-celled organisms, living beings have evolved to 
reach the somatic fullness —the phenotype— of 
non-human primates, orangutans and Homo sa-
piens.
Homo sapiens split from orangutans and chimpan-
zees approximately 8 and 5 million years ago, re-
spectively(3). 
Some organic structures of these hominins have 
undergone changes since early genus Homo, espe-
cially the brain, which increased in size from 450 
cm3 in primitive hominins to 1350 cm3 in mod-
ern humans. 
In his 1859 book On the Origin of Species, Darwin 
stated that the development and evolution of liv-
ing beings is governed by natural selection, which 
makes the fittest prevail and eliminates the weak-
est(6). If we accept this theory, it could be said 
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that living beings themselves and species are not 
immutable, and that differences in their pheno-
types are the consequence of the aforementioned 
biological evolution(6).
The transhumanist paradigm understands “hu-
manity” as a bridge to a higher way of life. It is, 
therefore, an evolutionary episode, a form of life 
that must hybridize with the artificial in order to 
overcome its vulnerability to disease and death. 
This hybridization should not be avoided, as it 
constitutes a requirement of universal conscious-
ness that is expressed in a small representation of 
itself: human consciousness. Assuming our re-
sponsibility in the evolution of cosmic conscious-
ness also implies being willing to replicate our 
personal consciousness in information technology 
to expand as software on more efficient supports 
than our limited biology.
Our reflection, on the basis of metaphysical real-
ism, concludes that the trans and posthumanist 
paradigm does not constitute an evolution or pro-
gress. People are not independent of the historical 
and natural conditions that constitute our living 
space, nor of the moral norms that derive from 
our “personal” as well as biological character.
It is also concluded that there are many problems 
associated with the transhuman and post-human 
horizons. A transhuman society would widen the 
gap between social classes as a consequence of the 
different capacities of access to improvement tech-
nologies. It would also suppose the appearance of 
mental and moral problems to give meaning and 
coherence to a life not threatened by the immi-
nence of death. It would also involve demographic 
and social and family relationship problems as a 
consequence of hyperextended longevity. The 
posthuman horizon, for its part, raises doubts in 
relation to the ownership and subsequent use of 
the “software” to which personal identity would 
be reduced.
It is concluded, therefore, that the emancipatory 
objective of transhumanism and its idea of  im-
provement are false myths that underestimate the 
self-limiting character of natural organization. 
There are no conflicts of interest.
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